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A. INTRODUCTION
Having been finalised in 2005, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements1 is the most recent attempt to improve the transnational enforce-
ment of judgments by a “double convention”.2 Recognising that States are often
concerned only to allow the enforcement of a foreign judgment if the court that
gave the judgment was exercising a credible jurisdiction, double conventions tie
liberal rules for the enforcement of judgments between the participating states to
proportionate rules of jurisdiction that all of those states have agreed to.
However, the Choice of Court Convention only establishes agreed rules for one
traditional head of jurisdiction – a contractual agreement to submit litigation to
the courts of a nominated country. It is nevertheless a worthwhile reform. As the
Convention was negotiated and concluded at The Hague Conference on Private
International Law, it promises the broadest international adoption that a double
convention has yet secured and, for that reason, its ratification and implementa-
tion is something that should be encouraged.3 But the high regard it has for the
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promises that businesses have made about where they will litigate4 is a more
important reason why, in common law countries that have not been so
supportive of enforcing those promises, the Convention should be implemented.
Many states that were involved in the negotiations for the Choice of Court
Convention have already had long experience of double conventions. At the
time the Convention was concluded, it was contemplated that there would be
questions of its relationship with more comprehensive double conventions to
which Hague Conference participants were already party.5 Foremost among
these were the European Union’s Brussels Convention6 and Regulation,7 and the
European Community/European Free Trade Association’s Lugano Convention.8
A number of features of the Choice of Court Convention are plainly there to
accommodate European arrangements.9
Australia and New Zealand both actively negotiated towards the Choice of
Court Convention, and were involved in the drafting of its text.10 Australia, at
the least, is currently considering whether or not to implement the Convention.11
However, as part of the economic and legal integration of the two countries
within the Closer Economic Relations (CER) market area, in 2008 both countries
also entered a bilateral treaty on civil court proceedings and the enforcement of
judgments.12 The Agreement on Trans-Tasman Court Proceedings and Regula-
tory Enforcement (“the Trans-Tasman Treaty”) largely gives effect to the
recommendations of a Working Group that reported in 2006 and which aimed
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to give better effect to the unusually close legal relations that the two countries
have always enjoyed, and which have deepened under CER.13 The treaty will see
New Zealand incorporated, with a few adjustments, into the civil jurisdiction
and judgments scheme that sorts litigation between federal and state courts in
the Australian federation. Legislation to implement the treaty has not yet
appeared, and there may be some refinement of the scheme in the course of its
drafting.14
It is therefore quite possible that Australia and New Zealand will soon ratify
and implement another double convention – the Choice of Court Convention –
which provides for somewhat different means of dealing with jurisdiction and
judgments. As the Trans-Tasman regime will deal comprehensively with the allo-
cation of general civil jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in the CER
market area, it will certainly include litigation of the kind that is to be captured
by the Choice of Court Convention. This raises the two issues that I discuss in
this article. First, there are profound differences between the two models – differ-
ences in the approach to the exercise of jurisdiction and in the ease by which
judgments would be enforced transnationally. Indeed, these differences are more
deeply seated than any between the Choice of Court Convention and the
Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention. The particular features of the
Trans-Tasman regime for jurisdiction and judgments are therefore identified and
developed. A comparison between the different approaches of the Choice of
Court Convention and the Trans-Tasman regime is then drawn. Secondly,
the Choice of Court Convention deals explicitly with its relationship with other
international instruments on jurisdiction and judgments. How these provisions –
especially Article 26 – would affect the simultaneous operation of the Conven-
tion and the Trans-Tasman regime will be briefly discussed. This leads to some
reflections on whether the Convention requires some rethinking of the arrange-
ments made under the Trans-Tasman Treaty.
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B. THE TRANS-TASMAN MODEL FOR JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
1. Trans-Tasman Judgments Enforcement
Australia and New Zealand have a shared history stemming from the European
settlements of the countries as British colonies (and in the case of Australia, six
of them) through the late 18th and 19th centuries. This shared history saw occa-
sional co-operation between them, and efforts at improving the enforcement of
judgments across “The Ditch”15 – the colloquial term for the Tasman Sea which
separates the Australian continent and the islands of New Zealand. From the
mid-1930s, the Australian states and New Zealand adopted legislation based on
the United Kingdom’s Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933
which, despite its name, was principally a means for improving the reciprocal
enforcement of judgments made by superior courts in the British Empire and
Commonwealth.16 The imperial scheme is one of “indirect jurisdiction”,
allowing judgment debtors, at the point of registration in the country where
enforcement is sought, to challenge the jurisdiction of the original court to make
the judgment. However, the present arrangements between Australia and New
Zealand sit inside the trading, co-operative and legal rubric of the CER Trade
Agreement.17 The CER Treaty has created perhaps the world’s most open free
trade area and, reinforced by the free movement of people across the Tasman,
has brought unparalleled economic, social and legal integration to the two
countries.
In 1988, during a review of the CER, attention was given to the place that
closer legal relations should have in assisting the integration of the
Trans-Tasman market area. A subsequent Memorandum of Understanding on
Harmonisation of Business Laws signed at Darwin that year promised the
“further recognition and reciprocal enforcement of court decisions in each
country, including enforcement of injunctions, orders for specific performance
and revenue judgments”.18 The result was disappointing, and inexplicable. In
Australia, it secured a federal takeover of the law relating to the enforcement of
foreign judgments by registration, which before then had been carried by the
states and territories.19 It added little else to the existing ability to enforce New
Zealand judgments in Australia, apart from enabling judgments of the New
Zealand District Court (an inferior court) to be registered in all parts of the
country. However, the legislation in both countries retained the basic structure of
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the imperial scheme of 1933,20 and as a result added nothing more to improve
the enforcement of judgments in trading and commercial relationships. It
retained the imperial scheme’s permission to test indirectly, at the point of regis-
tration, the jurisdiction of the original court to give judgment in the first place.
The registration of non-money judgments, despite the aspirations of the Darwin
Understanding, was unrealised, and remains unrealised.21 And as the two coun-
tries have taken care to maintain the CER as an economic arrangement and
studiously avoid any suggestion of political integration, it is strange that the only
substantial improvement in the efficiency of the enforcement of judgments
across the Tasman that came as a result of the Darwin Understanding was that
each country could extend its political sovereignty into the other.22 Express provi-
sion was made for the registration of revenue judgments and competition
judgments, and in both cases (and only in those two cases) any right to challenge
to the rendering court’s jurisdiction to make the judgment was denied.23 There is
little wonder that in 2006 the Trans-Tasman Working Group recommended
“further reform to create a coherent legal framework for resolving civil disputes
with a Trans-Tasman element”, and opted to do this by the double convention
model that “was designed to remove many similar problems between the Austra-
lian States and Territories”. 24
2. The Australian Model
In one sense, it is misleading to describe the Australian arrangements for the
allocation of jurisdiction between courts in the federation and for the enforce-
ment of judgments across state borders as a “model”. This might suggest that it
was consciously designed. In truth, the simple lines of the Australian federal
scheme owe as much to accident, good fortune and judicial reinterpretation (long
after its central legislative structures were introduced) as they do to careful plan-
ning. However, with the unparalleled importance they give to the principles of
the House of Lords’ decision in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd,25 they
probably represent the purest presentation of a common law model for a double
convention that is presently available.
In short, the Australian model provides for the absolutely free circulation of
any judgment made in any federal, state or territory court or tribunal anywhere
in the Australian federation. It is a “double convention” because there are, with
one important hitch, common principles of jurisdiction that help to sort litiga-
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tion between courts across the federation. Proceedings will be heard in the forum
conveniens, as determined by the exercise of judicial discretion. The hitch is for the
federal courts, which can only hear matters within federal jurisdiction and which
therefore, unlike state and territory courts, have a jurisdiction delimited by rules
as well as by the principles of forum conveniens.26
In Australia, the interstate enforcement of state court judgments is governed
by the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth). This perpetuates
arrangements that have been in place since 1902,27 by which interstate judg-
ments are localised by registration in the state where enforcement is sought.28
There is no restriction on the kind of judgment that can be enforced interstate:
the Australian model allows enforcement of money judgments and non-money
judgments of any kind.29 It also denies any place to traditional common law
defences to the enforcement of foreign judgments when securing interstate regis-
tration and enforcement30 (although this is also thought to be an implication of
the Australian Constitution’s requirement that states give full faith and credit to
judgments made in sister-states).31 It makes no provision for the treatment of
incompatible judgments. The Act of 1992 eases enforcement further by allowing
registration to take place by faxing a copy of the judgment to the appropriate
court registry in the state where enforcement is sought.32 This scheme effectively
gives all state and territory courts an inexpensive, efficient and unchallengeable
jurisdiction to enforce their judgments anywhere in the federation.
The principles of jurisdiction are more complicated. The Australian scheme
originally based the long-arm jurisdiction of state courts within the federation on
the rule-based model of the English Supreme Court Rules,33 and required some
defined nexus between the subject-matter of the claim and the state to be estab-
lished if a defendant was to be served interstate.34 However, the innovation of
the Act of 1992 was completely to abandon rule-based jurisdictions within
Australia, and enable the unfettered circulation of the civil process of state and
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territory courts throughout the nation. A writ from any state or territory court
can be served anywhere in the federation, and establishes the court’s jurisdiction
as of right.35 That court, though, is only to exercise the jurisdiction if it is the
forum conveniens. If it concludes that it is not the forum conveniens, it has discretion to
decline jurisdiction in favour of the Australian court that is the forum conveniens.
Significantly, for allocating jurisdiction between different Australian courts,
the forum conveniens is identified by the principles set out by the House of Lords in
Spiliada.36 It is the court “which prima facie is clearly more appropriate for the
trial of the action”.37 This is despite the fact that, in international litigation, the
High Court of Australia has consistently rejected the use of Spiliada.38 In Voth v
Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd,39 the High Court concluded that proceedings could
only be stayed or dismissed if it appeared to the court that it was itself “a clearly
inappropriate forum” for dealing with the dispute.40 The Voth standard has given
Australian courts the most forum-centric approach to international jurisdiction
in the common law world.41 It is possible to conclude that, in the foreign country,
there may be a clearly more appropriate court that could deal with the litigation
without making the Australian court “a clearly inappropriate forum”.42 The
recognition that this raises the possibility of parallel litigation also makes the
approach conceptually unsuitable as a means of sorting jurisdiction in a way that
identifies the best placed court to deal with the litigation. As is discussed later, its
application to choice-of-court agreements remains unresolved.43 Australian
courts have only occasionally assumed that the Voth enquiry directly absorbs the
question of how to deal with choice-of-court agreements,44 but even when they
do not use Voth in decisions about choice-of-court agreements, it is evident that
Australian courts still approach them with a Voth-induced preference for keeping
international litigation to themselves.
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For superior courts in Australia – the State and Territory Supreme Courts,
the Federal Court, the Family Court of Australia and the Family Court of
Western Australia – the question of forum conveniens arises in considering whether
the proceedings should be transferred to another superior court. Momentarily
putting the “hitch” with federal courts to one side, in 1987 uniform federal, state
and territory legislation invested the subject-matter jurisdiction of each of these
courts in all of the others. With minor qualifications,45 this gave each superior
court the power to deal with any matter that any other superior court could.46
Any proceeding could begin in any of these courts, and if a transfer was made to
another superior court, that court would have an undoubted subject-matter juris-
diction to deal with it.
It is sufficient for a transfer to be ordered that it is in the “interests of justice”
to do so.47 From an early point, some courts understood this as enacting the
Spiliada formula of declining jurisdiction, so that a transfer would be made to the
superior court which was the clearly more appropriate forum for dealing with the
litigation. The High Court confirmed that reading of the legislation in BHP
Billiton Ltd v Schultz,48 elevating the Spiliada approach to the point where, within
the Australian federation, but unlike its position in England,49 it is the sole deter-
minant of the proper exercise of jurisdiction.
A similar situation arises for the inferior courts – the local, magistrates, district
and county courts in each state and territory. Unlike the superior courts, they
cannot directly transfer proceedings to another court. Under the Service and
Execution of Process Act, inferior courts can nevertheless grant a stay of the
proceedings before them,50 and grant that stay on condition that the action be
pursued in another court.51 The Act expressly provides that the stay may be
granted if a court in another state or territory “is the appropriate court to deter-
mine” the proceedings.52 Inferior courts have been granting stays of this kind by
reference to the Spiliada formula that the interstate court is “the more appro-
priate court”.53
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The exception to this simple approach to the allocation of jurisdiction comes
with the federal courts. This is a matter of some significance for the Trans-
Tasman arrangements, as the Federal Court of Australia aspires to be a centre
for commercial and corporate litigation in the Asia-Pacific,54 but, of all of the
Australasian superior courts, it has the most limited jurisdiction in general
contract and tort claims. The Federal Court’s capacity to deal with commercial
litigation expanded considerably when it was a full participant in the scheme that
saw all superior court jurisdictions pooled, and which therefore purported to
allow it to exercise the state and territory Supreme Courts’ jurisdiction in general
commercial, contract and tort claims. However, in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally55 in
1999 it was held to be unconstitutional for the federal courts to exercise state or
territory jurisdictions granted by state or territory legislation. As a result, the
Federal Court may only hear claims in contract and tort that “accrue” to some
other action based on a federal statute – normally the Trade Practices Act 1974
(Cth). Federal courts can therefore only exercise a federal jurisdiction (including
an “accrued jurisdiction”), while, in contrast, the state courts can exercise both
state and federal jurisdictions. So, the jurisdiction of the Victorian Supreme
Court in an intra-Australian matter (and whether a federal or state question) is
determined purely by Spiliada principles of forum conveniens. But for the Federal
Court to hear any matter, first, the question must be within the rules that define
the limits of the court’s federal jurisdiction, and, second, the Federal Court must
be the most appropriate Australian court to deal with it. Although the rules
defining federal accrued jurisdiction are both vague and uncertain, they are
nevertheless taken to be rules, and compromise the otherwise complete reliance
on discretionary principles to allocate jurisdiction within Australia.56 The Federal
Court’s limited commercial jurisdiction was not considered in the negotiations
and reports leading to the Trans-Tasman Treaty, but it could have implications
for the effectiveness of some of the treaty’s legal machinery.
3. The Proposed Trans-Tasman Regime
Reporting in late 2006, the Trans-Tasman Working Group recommended that a
treaty on jurisdiction and judgments should extend the present Australian model
to New Zealand.57 In doing so it rejected a rule-based approach to establishing
agreed civil jurisdictions along the lines of the Brussels Regulation.58 The Austra-
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lian model, which I suggest is the archetypal common law double convention,
was thought to more suitable for countries “which share a common law heritage
and very similar justice systems”.59 Furthermore,
“because of the confidence that both countries have in each other’s judicial and regu-
latory institutions, many of the safeguards required for interaction with more distant,
dissimilar countries are unnecessary.”60
As a consequence, the Trans-Tasman Treaty that followed will create a genuine
Trans-Tasman Judicial Area – resting on an underlying “uniform writ stretching
from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to the Chathams”.61 This is also arguably the
world’s most liberal scheme for the transnational enforcement of judgments, tied
to agreed principles of jurisdiction that centre on the court that is, in the CER
market area, the forum conveniens. The Australian model is therefore to be
extended to include New Zealand with only the smallest qualifications. Initiating
process in any personal action that is issued by any Australian court – whether a
federal, state or territory court – will be able to be served (without leave) in New
Zealand, and the civil process of any New Zealand court will be able to be
served (without leave) anywhere in Australia.62 The same will also be possible for
the process of some tribunals.63 Any Australian or New Zealand court would
therefore have the right to hear any matter (within the existing subject-matter
and financial restrictions on its jurisdiction) in which a defendant could be served
in either country. From that point, the court will decline jurisdiction by granting
a stay of proceedings if there is another court in the other country that is the
more appropriate to deal with the case.64 A choice-of-court agreement is treated
as one consideration to take into account when deciding which court is the forum
conveniens.65 This represents a larger change for Australian courts which, at
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61 W Pengilly, “On Trans-Tasman Banter and ‘Things’ CER” [1990] New Zealand Law Journal 199,
200.
62 Art 4(1) Trans-Tasman Treaty.
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under the Brussels Regulation: cf Owusu v Jackson (t/a Villa Holidays Bal Inn Villas), Case
C–281/02, [2005] ECR I–1383, [2005] QB 801; J Harris, “Understanding the English Response
to the Europeanisation of Private International Law” (2008) 4 Journal of Private International Law
347, 371, 373–4, 381–3.
65 Art 8(2) Trans-Tasman Treaty.
present, must use the more myopic Voth principles of jurisdiction when New
Zealand courts might have some claim on the same proceedings.66 New Zealand
courts already use the Spiliada approach when assessing whether they or Austra-
lian courts are to deal with the litigation.67 There would be no means other than
deciding whether to stay proceedings on the ground of forum conveniens for placing
them in the most appropriate court within the Trans-Tasman area. Anti-suit
injunctions between Australian and New Zealand courts are to be banned.68
The agreement on common principles of jurisdiction centring on the forum
conveniens will allow the enforcement of any civil judgment made in Australia or
New Zealand by registration in a comparable court in the other country, and
registration will give it the same effect as a judgment of the registering court.69
This will extend to non-money judgments;70 injunctions and orders for specific
performance are expressly mentioned in the Working Group’s report.71 The
judgment debtor could raise only one defence to registration: that enforcement
would be contrary to public policy.72 Any other issue traditionally raised in
proceedings for resisting the enforcement of foreign judgments, such as fraud or
a denial of natural justice, cannot be used to challenge enforcement, and will
have to be raised with the court that rendered the original judgment.73
The Trans-Tasman Treaty does not provide for a regime that replicates the
existing Australian model in precisely all details. The regime therefore loses some
of the efficiency of the Australian model and, from the perspective of Australian
courts, brings some imbalance into the model.74 Furthermore, the proposed
Trans-Tasman regime also replicates a weakness of the Australian model – its
silence on the treatment of incompatible judgments.
First, the allocation of jurisdiction between the superior Australian courts uses
the mechanism of a transfer of proceedings to the more appropriate court. In
part, this is made possible by the legislative pooling of much of these courts’
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subject-matter jurisdictions among themselves.75 The transfer procedure enables
proceedings to be picked up in “the transferee court” at the point they reached in
the “transferor” court, and so litigants do not have to retrace any of the pre-trial
procedural steps they took before the transfer was ordered. The treaty does not
provide for a pooling of the subject-matter jurisdictions of Australian and New
Zealand courts,76 and without this a transfer between the two countries’ courts is
problematic. A stay of proceedings must be used. Accordingly, if the Supreme
Court of New South Wales (NSW) considered the New Zealand High Court to
be the more appropriate for hearing litigation, it would be required to stay the
proceedings (although probably only on condition that they be conducted in
New Zealand) and they would have to recommence, from scratch, in New
Zealand. In similar proceedings in NSW that favoured the Supreme Court of
Tasmania as the more appropriate court for the hearing, the NSW court would
(as at present) transfer the proceedings to Tasmania without any loss of pre-trial
effort or expense on the part of the litigants. Secondly, the Australian federal
scheme incorporates all Australian courts and tribunals. The treaty does not
provide for this, but rather that subordinate legislation in each country is allowed
to add tribunals to the Trans-Tasman arrangements on an ad hoc basis.77 Thirdly,
the Australian federal scheme includes orders made in proceedings in rem,78
whereas proceedings in rem have been excluded from the Trans-Tasman regime.79
Fourthly, in Australia it is still technically possible for superior courts to issue
anti-suit injunctions against each other,80 but Article 8(5) of the Treaty bans the
issue of anti-suit injunctions against proceedings across the Tasman. In this
respect, the treaty reflects the arrangements under the Brussels Regulation more
than it does the Australian model.81 This could nevertheless lead to difficulties
that themselves suggest it is preferable to retain the availability of anti-suit
injunctions in Trans-Tasman cases – although these difficulties should not be
exaggerated.82 The anti-suit injunction is the natural corollary to the mechanism
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of stays in favour of the forum conveniens, on which the exercise of Trans-Tasman
jurisdiction is to depend exclusively. With other precautionary constraints, it
formally allows proceedings brought in another court that is a forum non conveniens
to be restrained. Despite being, with the stay and transfer of proceedings, one
legal mechanism by which proceedings can be confined to the forum conveniens, the
Working Group recommended that the anti-suit injunction be banned for litiga-
tion that had claims on both Australian and New Zealand courts so that it not be
“used to circumvent the proposed trans-Tasman regime, including the provisions
on staying the proceedings on the ground that another court is the more appro-
priate forum”.83
It is not entirely clear how, if properly used, an anti-suit injunction would
circumvent the principle of forum conveniens at the centre of Trans-Tasman juris-
diction. Indeed, exclusive reliance on one discretionary mechanism, like a stay of
proceedings, to place litigation in the forum conveniens risks both lis pendens and the
possibility that incompatible judgments could arise within the market area. This
suggests that a second, more aggressive measure, like the anti-suit injunction,
might be needed to end any stalemate between Australian and New Zealand
courts. It would nevertheless do so without any conceptual compromise of the
coordinating principle of forum conveniens for the exercise of Trans-Tasman juris-
diction. The analysis that follows assumes, however, that the court issuing an
anti-suit injunction has first concluded that it is the forum conveniens by reference to
the Spiliada standard and not, as in Australia at present, when merely concluding
that is not a clearly inappropriate forum.84
There are two considerations that suggest the need for the anti-suit injunction
to assist the stay of proceedings so as to deal effectively with the potential for lis
pendens in the Trans-Tasman regime. The first are the vague limitations on the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia. From the time that
Australian courts gained the power to transfer proceedings between them up
until Wakim, an anti-suit injunction was issued only once: the Federal Court
enjoining litigants not to pursue parallel proceedings in the South Australian
Supreme Court.85 A consequence of Wakim was the reactivation of jurisdictional
contests between federal and state courts – contests that are addressed by
anti-suit injunctions. In “accrued jurisdiction”, which is the principal means by
which the Federal Court can hear many, if not most, of the commercial disputes
that come before it, there is ample opportunity for litigants to disagree on the
court’s right to hear the proceedings. As a result, there is an enhanced role for
anti-suit injunctions from state courts that target commercial litigation which sits
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toward the extremities of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. There is also a role for
Federal Court injunctions that protect its aspiration to deal with commercial
disputes which centre on federal law.86 There is every reason to suggest that this
problem will also dog Trans-Tasman disputes. Without an anti-suit injunction to
deal with it there remains a risk that the New Zealand High Court, in particular,
and the Federal Court could each consider itself the forum conveniens, and be left
without any means of terminating parallel proceedings before they came to judg-
ment. This is a position the superior Australian courts do not suffer under the
intra-Australian model, but that is only because they can use the anti-suit
injunction.
The second consideration why, at present, the ban on anti-suit injunctions
could present difficulties for the Trans-Tasman regime relates to the treatment of
choice-of-court agreements. This would be less significant if the jurisdictional
rules of the Choice of Court Convention were brought into the Trans-Tasman
regime – an issue discussed below87 – but there is no suggestion of this possibility
under the Trans-Tasman Treaty. As it stands, forum selection under the regime
treats a choice-of-court agreement as only one consideration to take into account
in the search for the forum conveniens. Anti-suit injunctions have been important
means of enforcing exclusive choice-of-court agreements when, in breach of
contract, a party to the agreement litigates in a different court that does not itself
decline jurisdiction.88 On the face of the Trans-Tasman Treaty, the risk that its
principles of jurisdiction will trump any party autonomy expressed in a
choice-of-court agreement is less than is the case under the Brussels Regulation,
where a court first seised of jurisdiction on some ground other than a
choice-of-court agreement will be given priority.89 But Australian courts, at
present, are more likely to hold jurisdiction against the terms of an agreement
choosing a foreign court than they are to enforce it.90 It may be that the
Trans-Tasman regime itself compels Australian courts to change this approach
to choice-of-court agreements – or at least to agreements that select New
Zealand courts. In general, Australian courts are much more inclined to enforce
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a derogating choice-of-court agreement in interstate litigation than they are in
international cases,91 and, as the purpose of the Trans-Tasman regime is effec-
tively to bring New Zealand into the intra-Australian scheme of jurisdiction and
judgments, that practice might well be extended to Trans-Tasman litigation.
However, the treaty gives no assurance that the present Australian practice will
change, and without that it seems that the anti-suit injunction could be needed to
place litigation in the contractually chosen court. But, so far as the treatment of
choice-of-court agreements is concerned, the adoption of the jurisdictional rules
of the Choice of Court Convention in Trans-Tasman cases would be a more
effective solution.
Even before Wakim, it was evident that the power to stay or transfer proceed-
ings in Australia was insufficient to prevent parallel proceedings from arising in
different courts.92 It still remains preferable to align intra-Australian and Trans-
Tasman arrangements so that the ban on anti-suit injunctions is lifted, at the
least, for the superior courts of both countries. This would only preserve the
existing powers of the New Zealand High Court to restrain proceedings in
Australia, and of Australian superior courts to restrain proceedings in New
Zealand. Again, a high degree of co-operation between courts on either side of
the Tasman can be expected, and the issue of an anti-suit injunction is likely to
be rare. It should be even rarer if Australian practice in relation to choice-
of-court agreements would show more respect for party autonomy. However, a
problem that is harder to solve (because it requires constitutional change in
Australia) is the contestable commercial jurisdiction of the Federal Court.
Australian experience has been that this has revived the importance of the
anti-suit injunction as a means of avoiding lis pendens, and it is hard to see why
that, too, should not be available in Trans-Tasman litigation.
Fifthly, under the Australian scheme, there are no grounds to refuse registra-
tion of an interstate judgment.93 It is the settled position in Australia that states
are constitutionally prohibited from refusing to apply the law or judgment of
another state on public policy grounds;94 one reason why the circulation of judg-
ments across the Australian federation is “absolutely free”. In the Trans-Tasman
regime, public policy is available as the sole ground for challenging the registra-
tion of a judgment from the other country.95 This gives rise to two further issues.
The first is why no express provision is made for the treatment of incompatible
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judgments of courts in the CER market area. The Australian scheme is silent on
the point and, as the Service and Execution of Process Act is a code for the
interstate enforcement of judgments, Australian courts have no statutory guid-
ance as to how they should deal with an incompatible judgment from another
state. The common law rule is that the court (with a recognised international
jurisdiction) that rendered judgment first is the court that makes the issues in
dispute res judicata, and subsequent judgments should give way to its judgment.96
Unfortunately, the codification of interstate enforcement in Australia does not
allow reference to the common law rule. When recommending the present
scheme for the interstate enforcement of judgments, the Australian Law Reform
Commission also thought that priority would be given to the judgment made
first.97 It remains unclear why, even if the likelihood of incompatible judgments
is a small one, the commission then refused to recommend a statutory rule to
that effect. That is the position that has been carried into the Trans-Tasman
regime. The Working Group took the view that, as different courts coming to
different judgments is a scenario that is most unlikely to happen, there is no need
to legislate for incompatible judgments.98 However, for any scheme that sorts liti-
gation between courts exclusively by the exercise of their own discretion, and
leaves them without anti-suit injunctions to restrain parallel proceedings brought
to their attention, a simple statutory direction for the treatment of incompatible
judgments would seem a worthwhile precaution.
The second further consideration returns us to the public policy ground for
refusing recognition of a judgment made in the other country. It might be
thought that this is only a formal, theoretical defence, and one that is practically
unusable. Australian and New Zealand courts have never been reported as
applying public policy as a ground for refusing to enforce a foreign civil judg-
ment.99 Indeed, in Bolton v Marine Services Ltd100 Thomas J in the New Zealand
High Court intimated that there was a public policy of deterring absconding
debtors that gave competing reasons to prefer the recognition of foreign judg-
ments.101 The one role that the public policy ground for refusing to enforce a
Trans-Tasman judgment might legitimately have is that it could allow the courts
a backdoor means of introducing a rule for dealing with incompatible judgments
– and probably the common law rule at that.102 In more general and principled
terms, however, the public policy defence appears to be one of those “safeguards
required for interaction with more distant, dissimilar countries” that the Working
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Group thought unnecessary within Trans-Tasman arrangements.103 It is arguably
incompatible with the Trans-Tasman Treaty’s recital of the two countries’ “close
historic, political and economic relationship”, and each country’s “confidence in
the judicial and regulatory institutions of the other”.104 Furthermore, given the
high degree of intergovernmental co-operation between Australia and New
Zealand, it is extremely unlikely that judgments made in one country would be
so contrary to the other’s basic notions of justice as to offend its public policy.
The two countries have already disallowed the public policy defence to the
enforcement of each other’s revenue judgments,105 and it would be preferable
that it be denied even more generally.106
C. THE CONVENTION AND THE TRANS-TASMAN REGIME: A COMPARISON
Even though the legislation implementing the Trans-Tasman Treaty has yet to
be finalised,107 there is enough in the treaty to suggest that the basic institutions
of the Trans-Tasman regime for jurisdiction and judgments will differ pro-
foundly from those of the Choice of Court Convention.
1. Jurisdiction
The Choice of Court Convention regulates the jurisdiction of courts when busi-
nesses agree to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of a given country and, in
its approach to jurisdiction, inherits the rule-based approach taken in the Prelim-
inary draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, and the Brussels
August 2009 Journal of Private International Law 229
103 Working Group Report, supra n 13, 10, 13.
104 Preamble, Trans-Tasman Treaty.
105 S 7(2)(a)(ix) Foreign Judgments Act 1992 (Cth); s 6(1)(e) Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act
1934 (NZ). See also Art 5(7) Trans-Tasman Treaty.
106 The example given in the Discussion Paper is of an Australian court awarding damages for
personal injuries against a New Zealander for an accident that occurred in New Zealand. The
Working Group suggests that, if this were to be enforced by registration in New Zealand, it could
be contrary to that country’s public policy as it would be incompatible with the no-fault accident
compensation scheme of the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (NZ): Discus-
sion Paper, supra n 13, 16. This scenario is probably inspired by Stevens v Head (1993) 176 CLR
433, but today is extremely unlikely. First, if proceedings are brought relating to an accident in
the other country, the Spiliada principles of forum conveniens that will govern the question of
declining jurisdiction in both countries are most likely to see the litigation referred to a court in
the place of the accident. Secondly, as they currently stand, Australian choice-of-law rules will not
see the relevant Australian law relating to personal injuries apply to an accident that occurs in
New Zealand: Regie National des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491. New Zealand law
would be applied. Thirdly, even if this improbable legal situation did arise, there remains the
question whether the incompatibility of an Australian award of damages for personal injuries
(against a New Zealand defendant or insurer) with the compensation available under the New
Zealand no-fault scheme is so offensive to New Zealand’s ideas of basic justice as to fall within the
public policy exception for the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
107 Supra n 14.
and Lugano Conventions on which the Preliminary draft drew.108 The difference
with the discretionary, common law approach of the proposed Trans-Tasman
regime is therefore in the foundational assumptions of the Convention, and is
likely to give rise to other differences in the conceptualising of exclusive choice-
of-court agreements and the effect to be given to them.
According to Article 3 of the Convention, a choice-of-court agreement is
“exclusive” if, for deciding how disputes between the businesses will be deter-
mined, it designates the courts of a contracting state “to the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of any other courts”.109 However, it deems the agreement to be
exclusive “unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise”.110 In short, so
long as the reference in a choice-of-court clause in a contract is to one
contracting state and one only, it is an exclusive choice. While the language of a
“presumption” of exclusiveness was carefully avoided in the Convention,111 the
result is in effect a presumed position. It is an exclusive choice unless evidence to
the contrary can be mustered. Furthermore, and somewhat artificially, as the
contracting states are often federal or multi-jurisdictional nations, an agreement
to have disputes dealt with in the courts of, say, a named federal nation state
(where no other nation state is mentioned) will itself be deemed exclusive.112
The Convention therefore defines an exclusive choice-of-court agreement
much more broadly than tends to be the case at common law. The common law
draws a distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive choice-of-court agree-
ments, although commentators suggest that the distinction is more marked and
of greater legal significance in Australia.113 The choice of court must be under-
stood as excluding the right of the parties to sue in any court except the one
named in the agreement.114 An exclusive choice-of-court agreement proceeds on
the assumption that, if parties did choose to have disputes heard only in a given
court (or the courts of a given country), it is a breach of contract to bring pro-
ceedings somewhere else. Accordingly, a contextual judgment is made of the
language of the clause to assess whether the parties intended that, if one of them
did sue somewhere else, this would amount to a breach of contract.115 Different
approaches to the identification of choice-of-court agreements as exclusive or
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non-exclusive have been taken by courts, including the making of a presumption
in favour of exclusiveness.116 However, Adrian Briggs has made a powerful argu-
ment that reasons can be given for presuming for and against both exclusiveness
and non-exclusiveness, and so “attempts to short-circuit the analysis of what the
parties actually agreed with presumptions about what they must rationally have
wanted . . . are insecure and unreliable”.117 No presumption has replaced the
basic common law position that it is ultimately a matter of construing the
contract according to its particular terms,118 and therefore of giving effect to the
parties’ proved intentions.
The different approaches of the Convention and the common law will inevi-
tably lead to different characterisations of choice-of-court agreements.119 For
instance, in Atwood Oceanics Australia Pty Ltd v BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd120 the agree-
ment stated that “the parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Victoria”. It mentioned nothing else about the jurisdiction of courts. Article 3 of
the Convention would require a clause like this to be construed as an exclusive
choice-of-court agreement, because there is nothing in the parties’ agreement
that provides otherwise.121 Using common law principles, the Supreme Court of
Western Australia nevertheless found that it was a non-exclusive choice-of-court
agreement and that, as result, proceedings could be brought in Western Australia
without being in breach of contract.122 That would be a possible construction of
the agreement for any Australian or New Zealand court to take at common law
and, almost certainly, under the Trans-Tasman regime. But it would still be
incompatible with the approach demanded under the Choice of Court
Convention.
If the agreement stated only that the parties agree to “submit to the jurisdic-
tion of any competent court in the Commonwealth of Australia”, the
Convention would also treat this as “exclusive” for its purposes.123 Under normal
common law principles, again, courts would have little choice but to construe
this as non-exclusive,124 as (not counting Australia’s external territories) the
parties effectively agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of courts in eight states
and territories that apply eight different systems of contract law.
August 2009 Journal of Private International Law 231
116 Ibid, 113.
117 Ibid, 115.
118 Garnett, supra n 43, 4.
119 Fairley and Archibald, supra n 3, 428–9; J Hogan-Doran, “Choice of Forum and the Hague
Choice of Courts Convention – A Forum Shopper’s Lament?” Colloquium Paper, 3–10; Nanda,
supra n 3, 779.
120 Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Master Seaman, 6 August 1987.
121 Explanatory Report, supra n 5, 23; Brand and Herrup, supra n 111, 43.
122 Atwood Oceanics Australia Pty Ltd v BHP Petroleum Pty Ltd, Unreported, Supreme Court of Western
Australia, Master Seaman, 6 August 1987, [3].
123 Art 25(1)(c) Choice of Court Convention; Brand and Herrup, supra n 111, 43.
124 Woolworths v DS McMillan, Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Rogers J, 29
February 1988.
The second difference lies in the effect given to an exclusive choice-of-court
agreement. This is the centrepiece of the Convention. Article 5 gives the chosen
courts, if in a Convention country, the right to exercise jurisdiction.125 They can-
not exercise a discretion, on the ground of forum non conveniens or otherwise, not to
deal with the case.126 Article 6 requires courts in any other Convention country
not to exercise jurisdiction. In fact, other Convention country courts must
suspend or dismiss proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court
agreement (as defined in the Convention).127
This is the key point of distinction with the Trans-Tasman Treaty. The
Convention embodies an unqualified insistence that, if businesses have promised
to litigate only in a given place, they will be expected to honour that promise.128
Particularly in Australia, the common law is nowhere near as exacting about the
keeping of these promises.
The case-law reinforces that common law courts will potentially endorse a
breach of contract by holding on to litigation brought before them in breach of
an exclusive choice-of-court agreement. This is more likely to be found in
Australian decisions in international contractual disputes, as an Australian court
remains at least influenced by the Voth obligation to refuse to stay or dismiss
proceedings if it considers itself “not clearly inappropriate”.129 In Akai Pty Ltd v
Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd,130 Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in the
High Court of Australia reiterated that the NSW Supreme Court was not
precluded from hearing proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive
choice-of-court agreement, although the breach might be a consideration that
the court would take into account to decline the exercise of jurisdiction.131
However, the Akai majority thought that, unless there were strong reasons not to
enforce the choice-of-court agreement, the proceedings should normally be
stayed or dismissed.132 This brought some slippage from the earlier practice in
Australia, when only strong evidence would have allowed proceedings to be
brought contrary to an exclusive choice.133 In a series of studies, Mary Keyes has
established that Australian courts have progressively become more prepared to
hold proceedings brought in breach of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement.
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In the first study, Dr Keyes noted that from 1991 to 2001 an Australian court
held jurisdiction against the terms of a choice-of-court agreement in 46 per cent
of all cases.134 More recently, she has also found that since 2001 the court has
held jurisdiction against the terms of an exclusive choice-of-court agreement in
89 per cent of cases.135 Akai, decided mid-way through the first period, may well
have accentuated the parochial leanings of Voth. The samples are relatively small,
but in whatever way these surveys are read they reinforce that Australian courts
would be forced to make a large change in attitude to international litigation if
the Choice of Court Convention were implemented.
From a purely doctrinal perspective, the Spiliada principles give a better pros-
pect of courts requiring the performance of choice-of-court agreements.
Australian courts using the Spiliada principles in interstate litigation have recog-
nised the possibility that the proceedings can be held by the court against the
terms of a choice-of-court agreement, but more consistently than in interna-
tional litigation have required the parties to be kept to their bargain.136 In World
Firefighters Games Brisbane v World Firefighters Games Western Australia Inc,137 the parties
agreed to arrange the staging of “The World Firefighters Games” in Queens-
land, but also to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Western Australian
courts for any disputes under the contract. Proceedings under the contract were
brought in the Supreme Court of Queensland, but a transfer to the Supreme
Court of Western Australia was sought. Almost all connections of any signifi-
cance in the case were with Queensland, which was actually, without more, the
most appropriate forum for dealing with the dispute. However, the exclusive
choice-of-court agreement was decisive in leading Philippides J to transfer the
proceedings to Western Australia. The fact that the parties, while conscious of all
of the connections that their arrangements had with Queensland, had neverthe-
less agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Western Australian courts made
the agreement an even weightier factor in the decision to transfer.138
As noted earlier, New Zealand courts already use the Spiliada principles in
international litigation. There, choice-of-court agreements seem to be subsumed
under the larger question of forum non conveniens.139 The small number of reported
cases involving the treatment of choice-of-court agreements in New Zealand
cannot give reliable evidence of any trend. In recent years, New Zealand courts
have stayed proceedings and so enforced an exclusive choice of the South
African courts for dealing with them,140 but have also retained jurisdiction
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against a choice of the Spanish courts.141 In no country has the application of
Spiliada principles to choice-of-court agreements seen courts abandon the
enforcement of contractual promises to anywhere near the extent to which this
has happened in Australia.
Although it has been argued that the granting and refusing of stays in
Australia on the ground of choice-of-court agreements are not conditioned by
principles of forum non conveniens,142 the Trans-Tasman Treaty clearly has the effect
of subordinating choice-of-court agreements to the broader search for the more
appropriate court.143 It is therefore more compatible with the present approach
in New Zealand. A stay is to be granted in, say, an Australian court on the
ground that a New Zealand court “is the more appropriate court to determine
the proceedings”.144 Article 8(2) of the Treaty then provides that “the more
appropriate court” is to be determined “having regard to . . . whether there is
agreement between the parties to the proceeding about the court or place where
proceedings should be heard”. Accordingly, the effect is to bring the decision to
enforce choice-of-court agreements under a Spiliada-like discretion to hold on to
the proceedings or to let them go. Despite being more deferent to choice-of-court
agreements than the Australian approach, the New Zealand approach still recog-
nises that courts are allowed to dishonour them.145
A decade ago, Richard Garnett argued that Australian courts had “been slow
to recognise the importance” of choice-of-court agreements, and in allowing
proceedings to be held against the terms of a choice-of-court agreement had
undermined certainty in commercial contractual relations and had harmed
commercial expectations.146 The evidence suggests that, since then, they have
become even slower, and have now reached a point of disregard for certainty of
contract that is unknown in other developed countries.147 The insistence in the
Choice of Court Convention on the performance of exclusive choice-of-court
agreements would be an important and valuable correction to this. The
Trans-Tasman Working Group made recommendations that suggested – albeit
vaguely – that where choice-of-court agreements figure in Trans-Tasman litiga-
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tion, “a court would be required to decline jurisdiction in favour of the chosen
court”.148 The Working Group then claimed that the “approach is consistent
with the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements”,149 but was silent on
the point as to whether the terms of the Convention were to be a legislated qual-
ification to the general forum conveniens principle of its suggested Trans-Tasman
regime. As it turned out, no attempt was made to incorporate the jurisdictional
rules of the Convention into the Trans-Tasman Treaty. They remain at odds.
2. Judgments
A double convention is oriented towards litigants concentrating the contest
between them in the court that first deals with the case, and reducing – or elimi-
nating – the possibility of litigation in other places where the judgment is to be
enforced. The judgment debtor’s greater exposure to the judgment in countries
where enforcement is sought therefore adds to incentives for it to engage prop-
erly in the initial proceedings. Consequently, successful double conventions (like
the Brussels Regulation and the intra-Australian scheme) are typified by exten-
sive litigation on jurisdictional questions and little, if any, on cross-border
enforcement. In the case of the Australian model – which has clear, simple and
unqualified rules for cross-border enforcement – there is not a single reported
case on the question under the Act of 1992.150
Under the Choice of Court Convention, the judgment can be refused recog-
nition if the choice-of-court agreement is null and void in the place chosen for
the litigation, or if one of the parties lacks capacity to make contracts in that
place.151 Convention country courts may also refuse recognition of judgments
awarding punitive or exemplary damages.152 From that point, the Choice of
Court Convention departs from the usual structure of double conventions. It
allows a Convention country to refuse recognition or enforcement of a judgment
if there was a denial of procedural justice in the original court,153 if the judg-
ment was obtained by fraud,154 if recognition or enforcement would be contrary
to public policy,155 or if the judgment is incompatible with a local judgment or an
earlier foreign judgment that is also recognised in the place of enforcement.156
These latter grounds for contesting enforcement parallel those that allow
enforcement of a judgment to be resisted at common law,157 or that enable regis-
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tration of a judgment under the imperial scheme of 1933 to be set aside. The
existing legislation in Australia and New Zealand still allows registration of judg-
ments to be set aside on the same grounds.158
The Convention therefore brings only two possible improvements to the
existing law in the Trans-Tasman area for the enforcement of judgments, but
suggests a further improvement for the Trans-Tasman regime. First, formally at
least, it retains the effect of a double convention by denying the right to chal-
lenge the jurisdiction of the court that rendered judgment. However, when
compared with the existing law in Australia and New Zealand this is only a
cosmetic difference. At common law and under the reciprocal enforcement of
judgments legislation, the foreign court is taken to have a jurisdiction that is
recognised in Australia and New Zealand if the defendant had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the original court.159 A choice-of-court agreement, whether exclu-
sive or non-exclusive, gives that submission.160 So in the conditions in which the
Convention is to apply, a judgment debtor would not have had an effective
defence of lack of international jurisdiction under the existing law. Secondly, the
Convention allows any non-money judgment to be enforced. This is not possible
at common law; nor under statutes presently in force.
It is only to the extent that the Convention allows enforcement of non-money
judgments that it would improve the conditions for enforcing foreign judgments
in Australia and New Zealand. It does not therefore promise the improvements
in efficiency for the circulation of judgments that the Trans-Tasman regime will,
and is therefore not as effective as a double convention. The Trans-Tasman
Treaty provides that public policy is to be the only possible defence to enforce-
ment of an Australian or New Zealand judgment in the Trans-Tasman Judicial
Area.161 As I have suggested, this defence seems unnecessary unless it can be
used as a means of dealing with incompatible judgments that emerge from
Trans-Tasman litigation. Even with the public policy defence, however, the
Trans-Tasman arrangements significantly elevate the incentives for litigants to
participate in the original proceedings, and to avoid duplicating litigation in the
place of enforcement. And so far as the possibility of incompatible judgments
goes, an express legislative statement of how they should be addressed is prefer-
able to a general public policy defence.162 Article 9 of the Convention itself
provides a suitable model for legislation dealing with incompatible judgments by
allowing recognition or enforcement to be refused if:
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“f) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested State in a dis-
pute between the same parties; or
g) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another State
between the same parties on the same cause of action, provided that the earlier judg-
ment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the requested State.”
The Convention therefore provides for the usual position that the first judgment
made by a court with a recognised jurisdiction to render judgment has priority –
a rule that is itself an incentive for parties to engage actively in litigation
commenced properly in a Convention country. A similar rule in Trans-Tasman
proceedings would therefore give courts an immediate response to any attempt
to register an incompatible judgment in the CER market area. Even more
importantly, it would enhance the incentives for parties not to pursue parallel liti-
gation in the first place.
D. THE CONVENTION AND THE TREATY: GIVING-WAY
The failure of the Trans-Tasman Treaty to take up the Working Party’s sugges-
tion of incorporating the Choice of Court Convention’s rules of jurisdiction
means that, if the Convention is implemented, the opportunity to secure a seam-
less approach to choice-of-court agreements in Australian and New Zealand
courts could well be lost. Potential conflicts between the Trans-Tasman regime
and the Convention must therefore be contemplated. As mentioned,163 the
Convention was drafted with the recognition that there was potential for incom-
patibility with other double conventions on jurisdiction and judgments. It has
therefore tried to deal with that by incorporating “give-way rules”.164 These are
set out in Article 26, and deal with the Convention’s relationship with treaties
between Convention countries,165 pre-existing treaties between Convention and
non-Convention countries,166 treaties for the enforcement of judgments between
Convention countries,167 treaties made by countries after they implement the
Convention,168 and Regional Economic Integration Organisations.169 It would be
expected that, if either of Australia or New Zealand ratifies and implements the
Choice of Court Convention, the other is likely to as well. And the creation of a
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Trans-Tasman Judicial Area by bilateral treaty potentially gives rise to the
application of two of the Convention’s give-way rules.
Article 26 begins by providing that the Convention is to be interpreted “so far
as possible to be compatible with other treaties in force for Contracting
States”.170 What will trigger a give-way rule in the Convention is incompatibility:
an application of the two instruments that leads to different results.171 While the
situations that could give rise to a conflict with the Trans-Tasman regime cannot
be exhaustively predicted in advance, the earlier analysis suggests that three
points of conflict loom: a common law characterisation of a choice-of-court
agreement as non-exclusive when the Convention has it as an exclusive choice;
an Australian or New Zealand court keeping proceedings in breach of an exclu-
sive choice-of-court agreement; and a defence available under the Convention
(say, an incompatible judgment) to a judgment debtor for resisting enforcement
of a judgment which is not available to that person under the Trans-Tasman
Treaty.
Conflicts of these kinds most likely attract the “first give-way rule” of Article
26(2). So long as both parties are resident in a Convention country and the other
treaty applies to them, the application of the treaty will be preferred. The
assumption is that all countries implicated in the litigation have an “interest” in
the treaty if it involves their residents, and none is therefore concerned that the
treaty will be given priority over the Convention.172
The Trans-Tasman regime applies to proceedings when a party is served in
Australia or New Zealand,173 again reflecting the common law assumption that
jurisdiction is grounded on a person’s amenability to the Queen’s writ.174 Espe-
cially for corporations,175 residence and presence within the national borders of
the two countries will usually coincide and so, by the Convention’s own rules, the
Trans-Tasman regime will apply. However, if a foreign corporation, doing busi-
ness in Australia or New Zealand but formed in a third Convention country, is
served with process in Australia or New Zealand, Article 26(2) does not allow the
Convention to give-way.176 In their terms, both the Trans-Tasman Treaty and the
238 The Trans-Tasman Judicial Area and the Choice of Court Convention Vol. 5 No. 2
170 Art 26(1) Choice of Court Convention. The co-reporters for the Convention state that, where the
Convention is “reasonably capable of two meanings”, the meaning that is compatible with the
other treaty is to be preferred. However, the language of the Convention is not to be strained to




173 Art 4(1) Trans-Tasman Treaty.
174 John Russell and Co Ltd v Cayzer, Irvine and Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 298, 302; Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR
310; Colt Industries Inc v Sarlie [1966] 1 All ER 673; Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 QB 283;
Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Victoria (2002) 211 CLR 1, 23, 36.
175 A corporation is “resident” where it has its statutory seat, in the place that gave it corporate
status, where it has its central administration or where it has its principal place of business: Art
4(2) Choice of Court Convention.
176 Brand and Herrup, supra n 111, 176.
Convention apply to this situation, but the Convention is to have priority. This
would also be the rule for litigation over a multi-party contract between busi-
nesses from Australia, New Zealand and a third Convention state (say, the UK).
In proceedings like this, the Convention’s rules of jurisdiction would place the
litigation in the court chosen by the businesses as set out in the contract made
between them. It is really only in the unlikely case of proceedings between the
Australian and New Zealand parties being conducted separately from any
involving just one of them and the UK business that the different treatment of
the one choice-of-court agreement could arise. Even here, courts might under-
standably be reluctant to characterise the one choice-of-court agreement (under
the Convention) as exclusive so far as the proceedings involving the UK business
were concerned, but non-exclusive (by common law principle) for the litigation
just between the Australasian parties. A different characterisation nevertheless
remains likely where the Convention’s deeming of a choice as exclusive is
patently artificial.177 For instance, an agreement that stated that the parties
submitted “to jurisdiction of any competent courts in the Commonwealth of
Australia” – a choice that is not limited to one jurisdiction – is itself powerful
evidence at common law for construing the choice of court as non-exclusive,
where the Convention requires it to be treated as exclusive.178 I reiterate that the
risk of different characterisations under the Convention and the treaty in a case
like this is small, and courts will usually do what they can to consolidate different
proceedings brought under the one contract. However, splintered adjudication
remains possible, and it is only the failure to take up the Trans-Tasman Working
Group’s recommendation to thread the Convention’s rules of jurisdiction
through the Trans-Tasman Treaty179 that makes it possible.
The other give-way rule that could apply in Trans-Tasman proceedings
relates only to the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Here, it could be
envisaged that a judgment debtor might have a defence against enforcement of a
judgment under the Convention that is not available under the Trans-Tasman
regime. In short, if any of the defences available under the Convention other
than refusing enforcement on the ground of public policy is arguable, the two
regimes are in conflict. Article 26(4) ensures that the Convention gives-way to the
treaty in this case, as its only requirement is that “the judgment shall not be
recognised or enforced to a lesser extent than under this Convention”. The
Convention, admirably, sets itself as the floor for the conditions in which judg-
ments will circulate,180 and is prepared to improve enforcement by deferring to
more efficient schemes for extending judgments. The refusal of the Trans-
Tasman regime to deal expressly with incompatible judgments is, nevertheless,
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one point where a conflict is possible. Under the Convention, the judgment must
not be recognised in the place of enforcement if it is incompatible with a judg-
ment made in the place of enforcement or with an earlier judgment made in
another Convention country where jurisdiction was properly exercised. Under
the Trans-Tasman regime, a literal reading of the treaty has an incompatible
judgment entitled to registration and enforcement unless the rendering court
concludes that registration would be contrary to public policy. Here, too, it would
be better that the Trans-Tasman regime adopt the provisions of the Convention
and expressly allow registration to be refused to a judgment that is incompatible
with one given in the registering country or state, or with an earlier judgment
made by any court in Australia or New Zealand with jurisdiction to do so.
E. CONCLUSION
The Choice of Court Convention is an important statement about the value to
transnational trade and businesses of certainty in contractual relations. Its ulti-
mate rationale might be to improve the extraterritorial extension of judgments,
but in that respect, apart from introducing non-money judgments into the range
of internationally enforceable orders, the Convention adds little to the existing
law on the enforcement of judgments in Australia and New Zealand.181 Rather,
it is in its aim of removing any issue about jurisdiction in relation to exclusive
choice-of-court agreements from efforts at enforcing judgments across borders
that it would drastically improve the law in the Trans-Tasman area.
Although New Zealand courts are also prepared to dishonour contracting
parties’ agreements about where to sue, the willingness of Australian courts to
use the jurisdictional discretions they have invented since Voth and Akai to hollow
out established principles of contractual certainty is breathtaking. The only
evidence that is now available suggests that foreign interests wishing to invest in
or trade with Australian businesses are best to expect that an Australian court
will disregard any agreement they have deliberately made to litigate in another
country. For Australian commercial law it is a juridically embarrassing and
economically naïve position to be in.182 It is counterproductive to the objectives
of establishing certainty in international trading and commercial relationships
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and of respecting business expectations. Legislative correction is now the only
practical possibility. The implementation of the Choice of Court Convention
and the extension of its jurisdictional rules to the whole Trans-Tasman area are
therefore opportunities that Australian and New Zealand Governments should
seize.
A principled rationale for the Convention’s rules of jurisdiction also suggests
that they should be preferred for the more intimate arrangements being intro-
duced for the CER market area, and for the intra-Australian model of
jurisdiction as well.183 In two respects, the example of the Convention can also
correct some weakness brought into the Trans-Tasman regime from the Austra-
lian scheme for jurisdiction and judgments – the risk of lis pendens and
incompatible judgments. At the front end of the regime, the effective deterrence
or termination of parallel proceedings in a Trans-Tasman Judicial Area is only
likely to be guaranteed if the superior courts of both countries retain the power
to issue anti-suit injunctions. The practical need for that will nevertheless be
reduced if the Convention’s rules of jurisdiction are also adopted in Trans-
Tasman and intra-Australian cases. At the back end, the Convention’s rules that
state when the enforcement of incompatible judgments may be refused would
bring worthwhile certainty to the terms on which judgments can circulate across
borders in the market area. The alignment of the rules for sorting jurisdiction
between all polities in the Trans-Tasman area with the provisions of the Conven-
tion is therefore both preferable policy and preferable practice. Some effort
therefore needs to be taken to stitch Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention into the
Trans-Tasman Treaty, as well as the terms of Article 9(f)–(g).184 The inclusion of
Articles 5 and 6 was the apparent recommendation of the Trans-Tasman
Working Group,185 and since both governments agreed to adopt the Working
Group’s recommendations it is unfortunate that they overlooked this recommen-
dation when concluding the treaty.186 Furthermore, a sensible alignment of
jurisdictional practice suggests that, for intra-Australian disputes as well, similar
efforts need to be taken to include the terms of Articles 5 and 6 and, in part,
Article 9 in the statutes that provide for the interstate enforcement of judgments
and for transfers of proceedings and stays within the federation on forum non
conveniens grounds.187 Indeed, it would seem that a stronger case can be made for
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a categorical rule that requires proceedings to be dealt with in the contractually
chosen court where each country and state undoubtedly enjoys more “confi-
dence in the judicial and regulatory institutions of the other”188 than is possible
for the larger group that is presently ratifying the Choice of Court Convention.
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